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IN THE
OF THE

SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH

VINAL MILLETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

GLORIA LANGSTON,

Case

No. 8750

Defendant and Appellant.

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The problem involved in this lawsuit is relative to the nature
of the business relationship between the Plaintiff, Vinal Millett,
and the Defendant, Gloria Langston, concerning the erection,
financing, running and other such matters of a trailer court in
the City of Moab, Utah. There was no written agreement between the parties and their testimony shows a variance in what
they apparently understood to be their business arrangements.
Some points are basically clear and undisputed however.
In April and May 1954, Vinal Millett (Respondent in this
Court and Plaintiff below) discussed trailer court possibilities
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with several people, among whom was his niece, Gloria Langston,
(who is the Appellant here and the Defendant below). No
definite details had been reached at the time of these discussions
'
other than the general plan of such a business undertaking, and
the City of Moab was the place located because at that time it
was a scene of business activity stimulated by Uranium Ore
Mining in the Area. The problem is: What was the arrangement
or the agreement between the Plaintiff and Defendant for the
building of a Trailer Court Business? If there was an agreement, what were the terms of the same? Was such partnership
ever terminated, and if so, is there any money due and owing
by either party to the other? This business venture was Plaintiff's idea.
Plaintiff was a carpenter, who, because of the weather in
the Salt Lake City Area, was seasonally unemployed and while
so unemployed was receiving unemployment compensation.
With time on his hands he was planning and formulating a
Trailer Court Business in the Moab area. They had discussed this
with several people (line 28, page 35) and finally the matter
was discussed with Vinal Millett's niece, Gloria Langston herein, (line 7, page 36) they were searching for someone to put
up the money to finance such a venture and Vinal Millett was
to go down there and do the carpentry and construction \\·ork
and to run the business (line 1, page 36). Plaintiff testified that
the arrangements between the parties \vere that the Defendant
\Vas to provide the financing and the Plaintiff \\·as to do the
building (line 2 3, page 37); furthermore the Plaintiff failed to
put up adequate tnoney to con1plete the matter in a hurry and
it was necessary to build the project using funds derived from
the business to assist in the expenses of further construction.
On this b~1sis, the Defendant did not live up to her part of the
arrangcn1ents ben,·een the parties.
2
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The Plaintiff remained in Moab for a period of 15 months
from May, 1954, until July, I955, during which time he built
and constructed the Trailer Court called the RIVER SANDS
TRAILER COURT, doing all of the work himself that he
could do, with the exception of some electrical and plumbing
.work (line I I, page 38). Because of the close family ties, and
not anticipating problems, very poor records were kept by the
parties involved (line 25, page 38) (line 2, page 40).
The Plaintif~ testified that they had about $240.00 income
per month from the operations of the Trailer Court and that
out of this $240.00 he was paying bills for materials (line ~~
page 40) (line 20, page 4I) and that he used approximat~ly $I.oo
per day for his own personal use (line 22, page 41 ). In addition to this money, for his own keep, he had $45 .oo per month
paid on his car for eight payments and also $2o.oo or $25.00 per
month sent to Plaintiff's wife. Upon completing the construction, the Plaintiff suggested to the Defendant that a woman
could now run the Court and asked her if she would want to
do it (line 30, page 42); and further that the Plaintiff \vould
come back in the fall, after he had had a couple of months rest
away from the property (line 7, page 4 3).
Apparently the business arrangements between the Plaintiff and Defendant varied and "grew like Topsy". The original
arrangements was that they intended to rent land and afterward
they decided to buy inasmuch as nothing could be rented (Ex.
2 deposition of VM 4: R. 37 ).
About May 2oth, I954, the Defendant purchased 5 acres
of land from Frank Peterson for $I Ioo per acre, paying $I 2oo
down and $I oo per month thereafter (pages 48 and 8 I ) . The
Plaintiff contended that he was to have an interest in the land,
but that the Defendant took title in her name alone. Later 7Y2
acres more at $I oo.oo more per month was added.
3
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In the beginning, apparently, Ira Millett, brother of the
Plaintiff, was to be a partner in the matter on a Va basis, because
of supplying material for this undertaking. This arrangement
was changed by the Defendant who paid approximately $4o.oo
to Ira Millett for the lumber that he provided, which he claimed
was worth $I I 57 .20. From the testimony of the parties, it was
evident that the Defendant on visits to Moab would have an
accounting on the collections made and receive the proceeds that
were available.
Plaintiff testified that when he left, he intended to return
and that he left tools down there, taking of course, his personal
effects with him when he left. (Deposition VM page 30.)
The audit or accounting rendered by Mr. Vance of Ernst
and Ernst Accounting Firm is of no practical value because it
was not a certified audit and it was impossible to verify or
certify the correctness of the accounting and the items in the
accounting (line I, page I48) ( I49, line 20) (line 27 page I49)
page I54 line I7) (line 23 page I54) (page I55 line 23) (page
I 56 line I 3) (page I 6o line 3o) ( I 6 I lines I and 5) ( I62 line 2 8)
(page 1 64 line 5) (page I 64 line 2 9) (page I 66 line 2 3 to line
30).

The income tax of Defendant filed before this action was
started is the best evidence of the profit from the operation of
the business inasmuch as it is self evident that it is human nature
to pay the least tax possible. .L~fter suit was filed, profits in1mediately decreased.

4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
. THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING OF THE COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO A PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUGriON AND OPERATION OF A TRAILER COURT.

POINT II.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT IN
JULY, 1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS
TO INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE
AS OF THAT TIME WITHOUT THE BUSINESS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED
AND TERMINATED.

POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION OF THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN THE
MANNER ADJUDGED.

POINT IV.
THE JUDGEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MUST STAND.

5
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.. ·- ARGUMENT
.
..
.

'

POINT .I .
.. THE EVIDENCE·IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE
FINDING· OF TH·E ·COURT THAT THE PLAINTIFF
AND DEFENDANT ENTERED INTO ·A PARTNERSHIP
.
AGREEMENT FOR THE CONSTRUCTION AND OPER.;;
ATION OF A TRAILER COURT.
'

The Trial Court found from. the evidence that:
· ~- " I . Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a partner. ship agreement for the Construction and running of .a
Trailer Court" (R~ I 87).
.
·
.

.

.

.

. . .. In reviewing the decision of a trial court · this Court has
stated that it will not overturn ·the ·decision of the T~ial Court
unless "it is manifest that the Trial Court has misapplied proven
facts or made findings clearly against the weight of the evidence." Ofara vs. Findlay,_6 Ut. 2d,.Io2, 396 P. znd 1073.
From the evidence presented below, it is quite clear that
the intention of the parties \Vas to .venture into the trailer
court business in an attempt to realize a .pr.ofit from. their efforts.
In HANSEN vs. BOGAN, 127 Oregon 399, 272 P. 668,
the Supreme Court of Oregon defined a partnership, by quoting
fron1 Chancellor Kent as follows:
· · · ''A contract of two or more competent- persons to
place their money, efforts, labor and. skill, or som_e .of
all of them in la"·ful con1merce or business and to divide
the profit and share the loss in certain proportions."
6
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In addition it is well established that: ·
"There need be no express agreement that each
party shall bear a share of any losses which may occur
in the business since as a legal consequence, one participating in the profits of a partnership is held liable for a
share of the losses."
20

RCL 826, Bentley vs. Bossard, 33 U. 396, 94 P. 736.

The testimony of each party expressly shows that a partnership was ~created by their participating in the creation of operation of the Trailer Court. The Plaintiff testified as follows:
"A. Well after she kicked my brother out, we was

all going thirds, see. She kicked him out and then she
says, 'Well, now you and I will split this and go half.'
She says 'Half of everything is yours.' (Dep. V.M. P22~
ex 2).
"Q. Did you understand that half meant one-half
of the property, of the real property.

"A. Half of everything.
As of what time, as of the time you left or
as of the time - as of now or as of the time of the
purchase?
''Q.

"A. As when I left and before and all times.
"Q.

So you claim-

"A. I am half owner.
You claim you own one half of the property
as it now exists?
"·Q.

"A. Yes. She has been sending word through her
mother to me at least once a week for the last six months
since I entered this Court and says, 'Now, you tell hirr~
that I am going to bargain. I am giving him half of
everything.' She is just trying to get me to cancel it.
"Q.

Do you have any such statement in writing?

"A. No. How would I get it in writing when it is
handed over the phone? (Dep. V. M. page 231, ex. 2).
7
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"Well, it was on thirds when we started, and then
after she released him, then she says, 'I will give you
half' (Rec. P. 45).
The Defendant testified as to the terms of the partnership
agreement as follows:
"Q. Now if this developed into a good business
venture that would make money, were you to get your
original investment back.

"A. I was - with the business itself, then Vinal
and I would, if there were good profits, then we were
. to divide the profits..
"Q.

Then you-

"A.

Over and above after the expenses were taken

out.
"Q. When you would get your money back, and
then you would divide the profits.

"A. What do you mean, get my money back?
"·Q.

Well, you had to buy the property.

"A. The property wasn't considered.
"Q. That wasn't considered?
"A. The property wasn't considered in my own
mind. It wasn't talked about that way. We talked about
the proceeds from the Trailer Court only (Dep. G. L.
P. 8, ex. 4).
Defendant further indicated that she understood Plaintiff's
contribution to the partnership as indicated by her testimony:
"A. Well, he didn't have any money, and I knew
it, and I \vas "·illing to buy property in my name. and
upon the property start a Trailer ·Court or a business
that he and I could venture into and maybe make some
money.
"Q. And \vhat were to be - what did you say \vas
to be his contribution?

"A. His contribution \vas to manage and to build
up the Trailer Court to a profitable business.
8
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"Q.

Was he to perform work?

"A. He was to perform work and in return he
was getting the receipts and paying miscellaneous operation expenses.
"Q. Now, this is the ag-reement as you entered
into it in Moab is it?
"A.

In Moab, yes" (Rec. P. 84, 85).

Thus the Trial Court had before it conflicting testimony
as to the inclusion of the property as partnership assets, however, both parties agreed that the profits from the operation
of the Trailer Court would be divided between them and in
addition both parties paid the bills incurred by the business.
From this evidence the Trial Court concluded, in favor of the
Defendant, that the property purchased was not an asset of the
partnership and that only the profits of the business and the
actual buildings of the business were subject to an accounting
While it is true that the Plaintiff withdrew monthly sums
for his personal expenses it was understood by the Defendant
that these sums would be part of the business expenses since
Plaintiff was to devote his full time and effort to the construction and operation of the business, thereby requiring certain
living expenses, and that any profit from the business thereafter
would be divided. This is evidenced by Defendant's testimony
found on page 2 3 of her deposition. (Dep. G. L. ex. 4):
"Q. Now did you ever agree to pay him a salary
or much per day?

"A.

No, there wasn't any agreement.

"Q.
forts?

How was he to be compensated for his ef-

"A.

From the receipts from the trailer court.

"Q.

He was to have all the receipts?
9
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"A. If there were any profits over and above
then we were - which he never said there were - well
we just didn't talk about it. He said there wasn't enough
money, and he used them to pay this and that and the
other, and so profits weren't even talked about. We
thought that maybe it might build up into something
better than it was."
We are certainly in accord with the testimony stated in
40 Am. Jur. Sec. 43, P. I 56, as quoted in Appellant's Brief,
Page I 4, since the intention of the parties to operate this business as partners were understood by them and known by members of Defendant's family (R. IOI ).
At no place during the trial below did Plaintiff introduce
any evidence concerning the receipts and expenditures, other
than those expenditures personally made by them and introduced
by oral testimony, the only documentary evidence on these
matters were introduced by the Defendant. From the record
it is shown the Plaintiff did not know what receipts and expenditures the Plaintiff received and made since the Defendant
"just looked over the books and take- and do some of the collecting herself, take the money and I suppose it was all thrown
in the same bag, you know" (Record page 66) Defendant's
brief, wherein she states, on page I 7, that "the records of expenditures placed in evidence by the Plaintiff accounting for
expenditures of $947. 1 3 (R. I 85) is in error, since Defendant \vas
the one introducing the · evidence. Plaintiff never received nor
was he shown a profit and loss statement, or any accounting
until the trial of this matter, and in fact had no knowledge of
any profit made by the business until Defendant's income tax
return for 1 955 was introduced into evidence.
From the evidence it is apparent that the parties entered
into an agreement to operate the business as a partnership with
the Defendant furnishing the basic property and funds and the
10
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Phiin;tiff -constructing and ~commencing operation of the Trailer
Court. Further, the evidence supports the Trial Court's findings. that there was a partnership and that it was an existence
· during the period complained of by the Plainti~f.

POINT IL
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN RULING THAT IN
JULY, ·1955, THE PARTIES HAD AN ACCOUNTING AS
. TO INCOME RECEIVED AND EXPENDITURES MADE
AS OF THAT TI1\1E· · WITHOUT THE BUSINESS
ASSOCIATION OF THE PARTIES BEING DISSOLVED
AND TERMINATED.
By its findings the ·Trial Court ruled that in July, 195 5,
~he .parties had an. accounting· and. employed a third person to
operate the business for them (Finding 7 R. 1 88).

Plaintiff maintains that there was no termination of the
partnership in July, 1955, but that he, "after an absence from his
wife for about 1 5 months, only qesired to go home for_ a short
·pe~i?d. and that he..would_ renir~ in about 2. months" to continue
operatio~s. · Pl~intiff further contends that when he left the
busine~ in July that everything .was ready for full operation
and that the business should show real profits thereafter and
t~at "he expt:cted to enjoy for. his lab~r and troubles, one half
of the profits of the business (Dep. V. M. page 23-24, ex. 2).
.. Both parties had contributed a· good deal, Plaintiff his tin1e
and labor and Defendant her money, in order to build the business to its operating condition in July, 1955. It is inconceivable
to believe that Plaintiff, just at the time when the real profits
were to be ·made from. the business would call everything even
between himself and the Defendant and leave the fruits of his
labor to the Defendant.
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

In addition Plaintiff · had established a credit rating with
the various businesses of ·Moab in order to carry on the construction and operation of the Trailer Court and it was primarily of ?is respon~ibility to discharge the obligation created
by reason of such credit even though the debts were those
of the partnership (Dep. V. M.P. 18).
Both. parties understood their business relationship and
since each had paid obligations of the business it can readily be
assumed that they each recognized their responsibilities for the
partnersh_ip obligations. The fact that the defendant personally
paid some of the obligations is not surprising since she agreed
to furnish funds for the business as her contribution (Dep. V.
M. P. 20). Plaintiff did not consider himself absolved from
an.y responsibility for the. debts of the partnership after July,
1 9 55. In fact, the Plaintiff recognized that the business was, at
that time, finally in a position to make money, and that the bills
owing on .the construction had been settled and the business
was in a p~sition to pay them some profits (Rec. P. 59).
,It appears that Defendant was the one who kept the books
and· records of the business and in view of the fact that the
·Defendant introduced evidence covering a period ending in
December, 1956, the Trial Court could only make its findings
based upon that evidence. The evidence did not show a diss~lu
tion of the partnership even as of the Trial Date, and the Court
indicated by its Conclusions of Law that the partnership would
be dissolved when the assets thereof were disposed of in accordance with the Court's Decree (Conclusion of Law, 2, Rec.

P. 188).
It is submitted that the partnership has not been terminated by mutual consent or otherwise and that there still exists
a partnership agreement between the parties.
12
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POINT III.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING DISTRIBUTION O·F THE PARTNERSHIP ASSETS IN THE
MANNER ADJUDGED.
While it is true that Ira Millet testified that he furnished
material for the construction of cabins on the property involved
herein, and while he had not been paid for the material, the
Trial Court had before it the testimony of Ira Millet that he
had furnished the material as a partner and that he did not expect to get paid for the value of the material in the same way as
if he had sold it to someone (R. 75). Reasonably it can therefore be assumed that the Trial Court did not place Ira Millet
in that group of Creditors to be protected by Sec. 48-1-37, Utah
Code Anno. 1953.
Defendant relies largely upon the figures presented by het
at the trial, which figures were based upon an audit conducted
by an auditing firm employed by her. Although this audit was
conducted by a Certified Public Accountant, the audit could
not be certified to be correct because the records were too incomplete (R. P. 148). In view of this, the Court accepted Defendant's income tax returns as being true, rather than to rely
upon the purported audit submitted (R. 135 ). Based upon the
returns the Court reached its Conclusions concerning the profits
made by the partnership business.
In ordering the distribution of the partnership assets the
Trial Court considered the fact that the parties had accounted
to each other in July, 1955, and that distribution should be made
only of. profits made after that date. Plaintiff made no withdrawals after July, 1955, thus the Court did not consider that
matter.
13
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Assuming that the figures present by Defendant's audit on
page I 84 of the record are correct, and giving the Defendant
th~ benefit of payments made, we find that from July, I955,
to December 3I' I9s6, the business. had a gross me orne of. $9,429.22.
"Business disbursements'' for the same period were S7 ,I 2 I. so. Other disbursements other than land payments and interest thereon, which would be excluded since the land was not
part of the partnership asse_ts, including for Defendant's benefit,
the taxes paid on the Ian~, amounted to $7 I I .42, subtracting the
total disbursements from the gross. income, leaves a net profit of
$I ,596. 30, which indicates if the Court erred that it did so in
favor of the Defendant.
Defendant complains that the Trial Court erred in granting an IN PERSONUM money judgment against the Defendant, and cites the general rule stated in STEINER vs. GOLDSTEIN, I 29 Cal. App. 2nd, 682, 278 P. 2nd, 22. We do not dispute the general rule cited, however, there has been recognized
an exception thereto where there are no debts or liabilities to
settle except as between the partners themselves, such course the sale of partnership assets, payment of debts and a final
accounting - is _not necesary. HOOPER vs. BARRANTI, I84
P. 2d 688, HARPER vs. LAMPING, 33 Cal. 64I, I76 P. 447·
From the evidence it appears that the Trial Coun's order of
distribution was equitable and just and well within the exception above noted. In order to establish an equitable distribution
of the property of the partnership the Court relied upon the
occupying claimants Statutes, Utah Code Ann., I953, (Sees.
57-6-1 through 8) as a realistic method of distribution thereby
affording either party the opportunity of continuing the operation of the business. It does not force Defendant to sell her prop14
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erty yet it does insure that she does not gain at her partner's
expense.
It is true that the Trial Court made no Finding on the
question of third party liabilities, however, it may be presumed
that the absence of a specific finding concerning that particular
point indicates that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant
it.
Calloway vs. Twin City Creamery Co.
190 Wash. 173, 67 P. 2d 329;
MacDiarmid vs. McDevitt,
97 Cal. App. 414, 275 P. soo.
It does not necessarily infer a finding against the Plaintiff.
POINT IV.
THE JUDGEMENT IS SUPPORTED BY THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND
MUST STAND.
From the facts and evidence outlined in the foregoing
Point the Plaintiff submits to this Court that the judgment of
the Trial Court is supported by the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law a_pd that_ the judgment as rendered is an equitable distribution of partnership profits and assets.

15
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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff submits that the evidence establishes a partner~hip
between t~e parties and that a distribution of the assets and
an accounting of the profits is necessary and that the Trial
Court had before it sufficient testimony and evidence to support the judgment entered in Plaintiff's favor.
The Plaintiff therefore prays that this Court will affirm
the judgment of the lower Court, holding that there exists between the parties a partnership that the assets of such partnership
should be equally distributed between the parties and that the
Plaintiff should be awarded judgment against the Defendant
for one-half of the profits from the operation of the partnership business as found by the Trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
DANSIE AND ELLETT
Robert Rees Dansie
Walter R. Ellett
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent,
Murray, Utah
4762 South State Street,
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